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RIGHTS AS A FUNCTIONAL GUIDE FOR SERVICE PROVISION IN 
HOMELESS ADVOCACY 
NESTOR M. DAVIDSON* 
Rights-based approaches to advocacy on behalf of homeless persons have 
long sought to vindicate important dignitary, liberty, and equality interests, as 
well as establish to entitlements to housing, mental health, substance abuse, 
and other services.  This advocacy has had some success in shaping the 
systems that define the interaction between homeless persons and the state.  
Rights paradigms, however, can be undermined by the day-to-day reality of the 
lives of homeless individuals and families that are often shaped by profound 
need less for protection from the state than for meaningful support, and 
entitlement advocacy remains circumscribed by the reality of severely limited 
resources at all levels of government. 
Given these constraints, this essay argues that rights at the center of 
homeless advocacy can serve an additional function.  The values underlying 
core rights asserted on behalf of those without shelter can provide a functional 
tool for providers of services to homeless individuals and families.  Deploying 
rights in this way would serve less to hone an adversarial relationship between 
clients and service providers, and more as a set of guiding principles for 
program design and implementation.  This essay accordingly argues that a 
self-conscious rights advocacy can help shape the systems that support 
homeless individuals and families, outlining core norms that advocates have 
asserted on the front lines of fighting for the rights of homeless persons and 
demonstrating how this is working in practice through examples from recent 
important developments in the field. 
INTRODUCTION 
As homelessness has remained a significant national concern over the past 
quarter century, advocates have taken a vital role in asserting the individual 
rights of those without shelter.  Resisting moves by many communities to 
criminalize homelessness, advocates have fought to protect a variety of 
important rights, including access to public facilities, freedom of movement, 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.  The author wishes to thank Deborah 
Cantrell, Henry Korman and Peter Salsich for their helpful insights, and Sara Gallagher for her 
excellent research assistance. 
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and the right to attend to daily life functions where no adequate alternatives 
exist.  Recognizing that the day-to-day lives of most of those facing 
homelessness are defined less by an overriding need for protection from a 
hostile state and more by a profound need for assistance, moreover, advocates 
have also worked to establish entitlements to housing, mental health, substance 
abuse, and other services. 
Although this advocacy has had mixed success, it has done much to keep 
homelessness from descending into a nameless, faceless problem rather than a 
crisis of individuals who deserve protection from often remorseless efforts to 
marginalize them.  The reality remains, however, that even as the current 
movement to end chronic homelessness garners increasing support, resources 
available at all levels of government remain woefully inadequate, and our legal 
and political culture is increasingly resistant to the idea of entitlements. 
Individual rights, however, can play an additional and underappreciated 
role for advocates.  Underlying core rights asserted on behalf of homeless 
persons are norms of dignity, autonomy, liberty, opportunity, and equality that 
have quite practical consequences if taken seriously in the design and 
implementation of services for homeless individuals and families.  Service 
providers appropriately tend to focus on pragmatic goals—serving the greatest 
number of recipients in the most cost-effective and (for relevant clients) 
clinically appropriate manner.  Norms underlying rights-based advocacy on 
behalf of the homeless, however, are directly relevant to how services are 
provided.  Viewing rights-based norms as a functional tool for service 
providers would serve less to hone an adversarial relationship between clients 
and service providers and more as practical, client-oriented program guidance.  
It is thus possible to design and operate emergency shelters, transitional 
housing, permanent supportive housing, and the myriad of other services for 
those facing homelessness in ways that, even if not necessarily translating into 
legally enforceable rights, nonetheless seek to advance the dignity and 
autonomy of those served. 
Many service providers are moving toward approaches that fulfill this 
rights-vindicating function.  Although not typically described this way, a 
rights-as-functional-guide perspective can be seen in a number of recent 
significant developments in the field.  A confluence of practical approaches to 
service provisions with an internalization of client-centered norms that parallel 
rights asserted on behalf of homeless individuals is evident in developments 
such as the rise of the “Housing First” movement and the trend toward 
permanent supportive housing; the increasing emphasis on short-circuiting the 
institutional cycle of placements facilitated by discharging clients from the 
health-care and the criminal-justice systems to the streets; creative new 
approaches to outreach; and, care for individuals with disabilities in less-
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restrictive settings following the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead 
v. L.C.1 
This brief essay seeks to make two points.  First, advocacy has a 
significant role to play not just in protecting individual rights and securing 
resources, but also in directly shaping how services are provided to those 
experiencing or at risk of experiencing homelessness.  Second, in approaching 
that task, advocates can draw on norms honed over many years of fighting for 
individual rights and for entitlements—norms that provide concrete, client-
centered guidance for program design and implementation.  In the current 
political climate, particularly at the local level where homeless persons and the 
government interact most directly, the need for individual advocacy is unlikely 
to abate.  An active engagement in the systems that have emerged and are still 
developing to serve those without shelter, however, provides an additional 
fruitful avenue to help individuals and families most effectively find 
permanent housing. 
I.  INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS IN HOMELESS ADVOCACY 
Advocacy on behalf of the homeless has taken on a number of distinct 
aspects since homelessness re-emerged as a fixture of national public concern 
in the early 1980s, focusing broadly on securing resources and challenging 
increasing moves to criminalize homelessness.2  This long struggle has met 
with mixed success, but this advocacy has produced a set of particularized 
norms that can provide robust guidance for serving those without shelter. 
A. The Daily Lives of Homeless Individuals and the Circuit of Services 
Best estimates suggest that roughly a million and a half to over three 
million individuals experience homelessness over the course of a year.3  The 
experience of being without shelter, however, is only the most visible 
 
 1. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).  See infra text accompanying notes 87-96 for a 
description of Olmstead and its ramifications. 
 2. See generally Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and 
Directions for the Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215 (2003); Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness 
and Human Rights: Towards an Integrated Strategy, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 329 
(2000) [hereinafter Foscarinis, Integrated Strategy]; Wes Daniels, “Derelicts,” Recurring 
Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and Lifestyle Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants 
and Implications for Legal Advocates, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 687, 691-695 (1997).  Homelessness has 
been a fixture of American life since the colonial era, with periods of more intense public policy 
focus, such as the 1870s and the Great Depression, alternating with periods of less national 
visibility.  See generally KENNETH L. KUSMER, DOWN & OUT, ON THE ROAD: THE HOMELESS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (2002). 
 3. See MARTHA BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S HOMELESS: EMERGENCY SHELTER OR 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING? 48-50 (2001) [hereinafter BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S 
HOMELESS]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW 
48 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:45 
manifestation of a complex of structural and individual problems that involve 
economic dislocation and poverty, as well as the effects of mental illness, 
substance abuse, and the interaction of these challenges.4  It is important in 
discussing homelessness to be sensitive not just to what unites various 
populations facing homelessness, but also to what distinguishes them.5 
Over the past five years, the federal government has focused intensely, and 
not without controversy, on “chronic” homelessness.6  The federal government 
defines someone as chronically homeless if that person is an “unaccompanied 
homeless individual with a disabling condition who has either been 
continuously homeless for a year or more, or has had at least four episodes of 
homelessness in the past three years.”7  While a small fraction of the overall 
population of those experiencing homelessness, the chronically homeless 
appear to be a relatively static population8 (and therefore amenable to targeted 
assistance), require disproportionate resources, and tend to drive public 
perceptions of the problem.9 
For many chronically homeless individuals, daily life involves a circuit of 
services provided in a variety of institutional settings.10  This circuit often 
 
 4. See Rob Rosenthal & Maria Foscarinis, Responses to Homelessness: Past Policies, 
Future Directions, and a Right to Housing, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW 
SOCIAL AGENDA 317, 317-319 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006); Christina Paul, Putting 
Homelessness into Context, 12 J. AFF. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 378 (2003). 
 5. See generally BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S HOMELESS, supra note 3, at 161-185 
(documenting varying patterns of homelessness). 
 6. See generally Martha R. Burt, Chronic Homelessness: Emergence of a Public Policy, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1267 (2003) [hereinafter Burt, Chronic Homelessness].  Some advocates 
have raised concerns that the current focus on chronic homelessness represents a divide-and-
ignore strategy, whereby the most visible homeless individuals receive public attention and 
resources while the needs of the bulk of those without shelter go unmet.  See Nestor M. Davidson, 
“Housing First” for the Chronically Homeless: Challenges of a New Service Model, 15 J. AFF. 
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 125, 126-127 n.14 (2006). 
 7. 24 C.F.R. § 91.5 (2006). Under the McKinney-Vento Act, by contrast, a person is 
considered homeless if they lack “a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence,” or if their 
“primary nighttime residence” is a shelter or “a public or private place not designed for, or 
ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.”  42 U.S.C. § 
11302(a)(1)-(2) (2000).  
 8. See Judith Hahn et al., The Aging of the Homeless Population: Fourteen-Year Trends in 
San Francisco, 21 J. OF GEN. INT. MED. 775, 775-778 (2006) (reporting on a study that indicates 
that the literally homeless population in San Francisco appears to be a static and aging cohort). 
 9. Public perception of the “homeless” and the political and legal responses that flow from 
that perceptions have been their own arena of advocacy.  Gary Blasi has argued persuasively that 
prevailing cultural perceptions of homelessness are shaped by stereotypes and associations some 
of which can be attributed to the lasting results of advocates who took the lead decades ago in 
defining the problem.  See Gary Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to 
Perceptions of the Causes of Homelessness, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 233 (2000). 
 10. See Kim Hopper et al., Homelessness, Severe Mental Illness, and the Institutional 
Circuit, 48 PSYCH. SERV. 659, 662 (1997) [hereinafter Hopper, Institutional Circuit]; see also 
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involves a rotating combination of institutional settings, a hobbled-together 
succession of shelters, rehabilitation facilities, hospital emergency rooms, jails, 
informal arrangements, and, of course, the streets.11  For those for whom 
homelessness reflects more of a structural economic problem and often a 
shorter-term experience, the network of available services is fragmented and 
disconnected.12  The result of this fragmented system of services is that for 
both the chronically homeless and for those experiencing homelessness on a 
more short-term basis, the experience of being without shelter involves 
significant dislocations. 
B. Swords and Shields in the Rights of the Homeless 
The homelessness crisis of the past two decades has spawned waves of 
advocacy.  Somewhat artificially divided, cycles of homeless advocacy have 
focused on immediate shelter needs, securing more permanent resources, and, 
increasingly, on individual rights in the face of attempts to criminalize 
homelessness.13 
Advocates responded to the homelessness crisis initially by focusing on the 
dearth of emergency shelter beds, and were largely successful in securing 
national, state and local resources to form a minimal safety net.14  Recognizing 
 
KIM HOPPER, RECKONING WITH HOMELESSNESS 135-143 (2003) (describing an ethnographic 
study of the use of public spaces by homeless individuals). 
 11. See Hopper, Institutional Circuit, supra note 10, at 663; Sidney D. Watson, Discharges 
to the Streets: Hospitals and Homelessness, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 357, 358 (2000); 
Stephen Metraux & Dennis P. Culhane, Recent Incarceration History Among a Sheltered 
Homeless Population, 52 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 504, 507-510 (2006); see also MARTHA BURT 
ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING CHRONIC STREET HOMELESSNESS: FINAL REPORT (2004), 
available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/PDF/ChronicStrtHomeless.pdf [hereinafter 
BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES].  Malcolm Gladwell recently chronicled one example of this cycle in 
his portrait of Murray Barr, a homeless man in Reno, Nevada who suffered from alcoholism.  
Barr cycled in and out of the local jail and emergency rooms, often several times a week.  See 
Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13 & 20, 2006, at 96-97. 
 12. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 41-49 (discussing the multiplicity of 
service providers).  Robert Solomon has described his experience with conflicts over funding and 
programmatic control that flow from how the “homeless” are defined.  See Robert A. Solomon, 
Representing the Poor and Homeless: A Community-Based Approach, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV.  475, 479 (2000).  Solomon recounts his mystification with an intense debate between two 
legal services attorneys over “whether homelessness was an ‘entitlements problem’ or a ‘housing 
problem.’”  Id.  What he later came to understand was this was in no sense an academic issue: 
how the problem was defined determined which agency funded services and accordingly how the 
needs of the clients would be served.  Id.  This kind of service fragmentation and resulting 
conflict over turf is unfortunately all too common. 
 13. As Maria Foscarinis has noted, legal advocates have employed numerous strategies 
modulating between litigation and legislative and regulatory advocacy, substantively focusing on 
both immediate and long-term needs.  See Foscarinis, Integrated Strategy, supra note 2, at 329. 
 14. See BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S HOMELESS, supra note 3, at 12, 93. 
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the limits of emergency shelters, advocates over the past three decades have 
engaged in a sustained effort to establish legally enforceable entitlements to 
services.15  Despite a legal culture increasingly inimical to positive rights, 
advocates have argued for rights to emergency shelter16 as well as housing 
more generally.17  Given the dearth of federal constitutional support, advocates 
have creatively drawn on state statutory and constitutional rights,18 and even 
international human rights law.19  Advocates have likewise sought to establish 
entitlements to other services necessary for homeless individuals and families, 
such as securing important rights to education for children facing 
homelessness20 and mental health and substance abuse services. 
This entitlement focus is evident to an extent in advocacy for procedural 
rights in social welfare programs that intersect with homeless populations.21  
Advocates have sought to ensure that clients are not erroneously deprived of 
benefits to which they are entitled, whether in terms of welfare, Social Security 
benefits, food stamps, or other general public benefits.22  Advocates have also 
focused on employment23 as well as other avenues of economic self-
sufficiency.24  Advocates have likewise worked for systemic and political-level 
change, shaping the national dialogue about homelessness,25 as well as 
defending political rights.26 
Civil rights law, moreover, has taken a central, if at times contradictory, 
role in the system of services for homeless persons, increasingly with respect 
 
 15. See Rosenthal & Foscarinis, supra note 4, at 319-320. 
 16. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1231-1232. 
 17. See Rosenthal & Foscarinis, supra note 4, at 317-318. 
 18. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1232-1233; see also Andrew J. Liese, Note, We Can Do 
Better: Anti-Homeless Ordinances as Violations of State Substantive Due Process, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1413, 1437-1433 (2006). 
 19. See Foscarinis, Integrated Strategy, supra note 2, at 327-328. 
 20. See McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435 (2000). 
 21. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1248-1254. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See generally Lucie White, On Abolitionist Critiques, “Homeless Service” Programs, 
and Pragmatic Change, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 431 (2000). 
 24. See generally Susan R. Jones, Representing the Poor and Homeless: Innovations in 
Advocacy, Tackling Homelessness through Economic Self-Sufficiency, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 385 (2000) (discussing microenterprise as a tool of homeless advocacy). 
 25. See Blasi, supra note 9, at 207-210; see also Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lawyer as 
Abolitionist: Ending Homelessness and Poverty in Our Time, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 237 
(2000).  The movement to end chronic homelessness, for example, can be traced to the work of 
the National Alliance to End Homelessness.  See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 
xiii. 
 26. See Tulin Ozdeger & Jewel Baltimore, Homeless but Not Voiceless: Protecting the 
Voting Rights of Homeless Persons, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 313 (2006). 
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to individuals with disabilities.27  The deinstitutionalization movement, and 
more recently, advocacy for less-restrictive institutional placements under 
Olmstead,28 are predicated on norms of equality and individual dignity. 
Beyond the focus on securing shelter and entitlements to services, 
advocates have played a growing role in seeking protection for homeless 
persons from hostile local communities.  Faced with the persistence of 
homelessness, local communities are increasingly utilizing criminal law to 
penalize activities associated with homelessness.29  This “criminalization” of 
homelessness involves restrictions on the use of public places, anti-camping 
ordinances, restrictions on the location of homeless persons,30 prohibitions 
against begging,31 as well as broad efforts to punish the status of homelessness 
itself.32  Criminalization also involves the revival and selective enforcement of 
provisions such as open container or loitering laws and sweeps of areas where 
homeless individuals are living.33 
Advocates have had mixed success in fighting this trend.  They have 
challenged sanctions connected to unavoidable aspects of homeless life as 
violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.34  This approach builds on a pair of Warren-Court-era Supreme 
Court cases—Robinson v. California35 and Powell v. Texas36—that together 
have come to stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment limits a 
 
 27. See generally Henry Korman, Clash of the Integrationists: The Mismatch of Civil Rights 
Imperatives in Supportive Housing for People with Disabilities, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3 
(2007). 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 87-96. 
 29. See Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and its Criminalization, 14 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (1996) [hereinafter Foscarinis, Downward Spiral]; NATIONAL 
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS AND THE NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND 
POVERTY, A DREAM DENIED: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 8 (2006) 
[hereinafter A DREAM DENIED], available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/ 
crimreport/report.pdf; see also Benno Weisberg, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violates the 
Eighth Amendment: Applying the Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness and Other Contextual 
“Crimes,” 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 330-331, 356-357 (2005). 
 30. See Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, supra note 29, at 16-18; see also Justin Cook, 
Comment, Down and Out in San Antonio: The Constitutionality of San Antonio’s Anti-Homeless 
Ordinances, 8 SCHOLAR 221, 223-224 (2006) (discussing one local example of a package of 
ordinances prohibiting sitting, lying down, or camping in public places, “aggressive solicitation,” 
and urinating and defecating in public). 
 31. See Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, supra note 29, at 20-21. 
 32. See Weisberg, supra note 29, at 346-356 (discussing cases involving status crimes and 
homelessness). 
 33. See A DREAM DENIED, supra note 29, at 9. 
 34. See Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, supra note 29, at 38-43; Weisberg, supra note 29, at 
346-356. 
 35. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 36. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
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state’s ability to criminalize “status” as opposed to “acts.”37  In a series of 
cases, advocates have asserted the Robinson doctrine to argue that 
homelessness and many aspects of life associated with homelessness represent 
a status that cannot be criminalized.38  Few courts have been willing to adopt a 
wholesale Eighth Amendment limitation on restrictions affecting homeless 
persons.39  Other theories for resisting the criminalization of homelessness 
have included the right to travel40 as well as First Amendment and Equal 
Protection challenges to anti-begging statutes.41 
C. Rights, the Need for Support, and the Limits of Political Will 
Rights-based advocacy, whether in securing resources or in resisting 
criminalization, faces inherent limitations.  In the individual-rights context, 
advocacy risks reinforcing an adversarial relationship between homeless 
individuals and those institutions that can at least potentially be a part of the 
solution.  That this risk arises from the inevitably defensive posture that rights 
advocates find themselves in makes it no less salient in considering the 
unintended consequences of an approach designed to ensure some space 
between official hostility and the reality of life on the streets.  Securing this 
negative liberty is critical where resources are unavailable to provide 
meaningful alternatives—a situation that is true in communities throughout the 
country.  What is secured is nonetheless still freedom to go about daily life 
under extremely marginalized conditions.42 
Resource advocacy recognizes that what is needed for many, if not most, 
homeless persons is less protection than support from the state.  Advocacy can 
change local and national political dynamics, but the resources devoted to all 
aspects of homelessness are far outweighed by the magnitude of the need.43  
The question then becomes how best to use the resources that are available.  Is 
there a role for advocacy in shaping how programs are designed and operated? 
 
 37. See Weisberg, supra note 29, at 338-341.  Weisberg notes the on-going debate in the 
lower courts about whether Robinson and Powell reaches “status” crimes that involve acts beyond 
the volition of the actor, a doctrinal step further than the prevailing “act/status” interpretation.  Id. 
 38. See id. at 331 n.12 (collecting cases). 
 39. Some courts that have rejected Eighth Amendment challenges have allowed a necessity 
defense on the premise that even if what is being criminalized is an act, not a status, that act may 
for some homeless persons be necessary to avoid some larger harm.  See Antonia K. Fasanelli, 
Note, In re Eichorn: The Long Awaited Implementation of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the 
Criminalization of Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 345-346 (2000). 
 40. See Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, supra note 29, at 43-48. 
 41. See id. at 27-34. 
 42. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, The “No Property” Problem: Understanding Poverty by 
Understanding Wealth, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1022-1023 (2004). 
 43. See Rosenthal & Foscarinis, supra note 4, at 319-322. 
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II.  RIGHTS AS A FUNCTIONAL GUIDE FOR SERVICE PROVISION 
Norms that advocates have spent the better part of the past quarter century 
honing to guide the relationship between the state and the homeless can serve 
an additional function.  These norms can provide a practical tool through 
which the needs of homeless persons can be placed at the center of the 
fractured web of services that define so much of the day-to-day lives of those 
without shelter. 
A. Alternative Accounts of the Role of Rights 
Rights can serve functions other than shielding individuals and securing 
resources from the state.  The clash of rights at the heart of the adversarial 
system is generally touted not just for its protection of individuals, but also for 
advantages that such adversarial clashes can bring to the institutions 
involved.44  Decisions are thus not only more fair in some abstract sense, but 
may also be more accurate and the result of better information.45  In the 
modern bureaucratic state, rights similarly serve an accountability function, 
ensuring that those most affected by the government’s decisions have a role to 
play in the substantive outcome of those decisions.46 
Individual rights are often seen as a cost to the government—a necessary, 
if at times grudging concession, that nonetheless undermine the effective 
functioning of public entities.  Adversarial approaches, moreover, are also 
most relevant where the interests of clients are truly marginalized.  Rights-
based approaches risk myopically focusing on crisis and not on the underlying 
experience of those in need of support.47 
As David Super has argued, however, rights can serve to improve the 
efficiency and operation of social welfare programs.  Super focuses on the 
potential of rights to operate as a ground-level, client-initiated auditing 
function, allowing recipients to provide a counterbalance to incentives that 
providers face not to be overly generous with public benefits.48  A managerial 
view of individual rights—that rights can shape the day-to-day manner in 
which services are provided—points toward an additional role for advocates in 
responding to homelessness.  Rights reflect a judicial, legislative or regulatory 
response to certain underlying values.  Rights in an adversarial system ensure 
that decision-makers give adequate weight to those values regardless of 
political or practical incentives to ignore them.  Jonathan Hafetz has argued for 
 
 44. See David Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of 
Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1063-1067 (2005). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 1070. 
 47. Cf. Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 (2006). 
 48. See Super, supra note 44, at 1129-1135. 
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overcoming the disconnect between legal advocacy and service provision.49  
Recognizing that what homeless individuals and families need most is support, 
Hafetz has argued that legal advocacy is too often disconnected from clients’ 
needs for support.  This argument is right, but limited.  In the structure of legal 
advocacy lies a set of tools through which advocates can advance the 
individual interests of clients by engaging directly with providers and policy 
makers in shaping the design and day-to-day implementation of services. 
B. The Functional Value of Rights for Service Provision 
Returning to the variety of tools that advocates have honed in fighting for 
the rights of homeless persons, it is possible to discern clear underlying values.  
The rhetoric of rights in advocacy for the homeless manifests concern for 
dignity, liberty, and equality.  These norms have evolved, even when the 
specific legal challenges have not succeeded, as concrete manifestations of the 
interests of the most vulnerable and vilified segments of the population. 
How might these values serve as practical guidance in program design and 
implementation?  Currently, service providers naturally turn to a variety of 
sources in creating programs.  In crisis situations, immediate need drives 
services.  The initial wave of shelter-oriented responses to homelessness shows 
the inevitability of this kind of practical experimentation and its obvious 
limitations.  In designing longer-term solutions, research-based approaches 
draw on the hard work of social scientists, psychiatrists, substance abuse 
experts, and others.50  Political reality is also a powerful force.  The political 
salience of focusing on narratives of family homelessness over individuals, for 
example, can shape programs with greater force at times than ground-level 
reality.51 
Viewing persons without shelter as rights-bearing individuals can thus 
have a direct bearing on programs that serve them.  Consider the liberty and 
autonomy interests underlying Eighth Amendment and First Amendment 
claims.  On one level, these claims serve the narrow—if critical—function of 
protecting homeless persons from overreaching state restrictions, particularly 
where no alternatives for daily living exist.  On a slightly higher level of 
abstraction, however, such claims also serve as a profound recognition of the 
value of individual choice and autonomy.  In other words, the movement to 
resist the criminalization of homelessness represents a concrete legal defense 
 
 49. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1247-1257. 
 50. See SUSAN WELLS ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., U.S. 
DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: ENDING CHRONIC 
HOMELESSNESS FOR PERSONS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES AND/OR CO-OCCURRING 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS 59-79 (2003) [hereinafter WELLS ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR 
CHANGE] (discussing evidence-based and promising practices), available at http://download. 
ncadi.samhsa.gov/ken/pdf/SMA04-3870/SMA04-3870.pdf. 
 51. Cf. Blasi, supra note 9. 
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against concerted efforts to dehumanize those living on the streets.  The 
act/status debate in the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of homelessness asks 
fundamental questions about whether homeless individuals share the same 
ability to exist in public space, to meet basic needs, and to go about daily life 
as those with shelter.  Courts have been hesitant to reach too far in judicially 
protecting those rights against assertions of deviance from community norms, 
but advocates have resisted the loss of individualization and choice that the 
criminalization movement embodies. 
Similarly, while procedural rights primarily vindicate individual 
entitlements, the individual dignitary interests they serve suggest that service 
providers themselves can involve consumers.  And however contested equality 
norms may be in practice,52 they represent a concrete commitment to 
individual distinctiveness, substantive fairness, and, under Olmstead, 
integration over isolation.53  In short, the panoply of norms that advocates have 
developed in fighting for the rights of homeless individuals can be applied to 
services for homeless individuals.  Advocates can thus work with service 
providers to translate abstract values into program-specific approaches that 
further such rights, albeit from a perspective less grounded in enforceability 
than advocates may have traditionally approached provider-client relations. 
This is not an argument for any specific mix or type of services, but rather 
for a new conversation within existing service structures, recognizing that such 
structures constantly evolve and adapt generally with an eye toward clinical 
and other practical outcomes.  The mode of advocacy explored in this essay 
would not displace those primary concerns, but would mediate them through a 
rights-filter that privileges consumer choice, autonomy, and equality.54  To see 
how this might work in practice—to move from the abstract to the concrete—it 
is possible to discern a nascent rights-as-functional-guide approach in several 
important developments in the field. 
III.  MODELING THE RIGHTS-AS-GUIDE FUNCTION 
A number of current developments in the arena of responses to 
homelessness evince a confluence between clinical and practical goals and 
 
 52. See Korman, supra note 27, at 6. 
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 87-96. 
 54. Cf. Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 886-887 (1990) (“Those who have been diagnosed as different, as disabled, 
must assume the power to describe their own circumstances, discover their own ‘capacities,’ and 
define their own ‘needs.’  The society must free them to locate safe social spaces where they can 
explore their injuries, feel their own fluency, and recast their ‘difference’ as the very ground of 
their power.”). 
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sensitivity to individual rights.55  Recognizing this underlying pattern can 
provide a template for advocates to engage with service providers and build on 
the promise of these approaches.56 
A. Permanent Supportive Housing and the “Housing First” Movement 
A central aspect of the contemporary push to end chronic homelessness is 
the increasingly widespread adoption of a service model called “Housing 
First.”57  With respect to individuals with mental illness, substance abuse, and 
dual or multiple diagnoses,58 Housing First reverses a long-standing practice of 
conditioning increasingly permanent housing placements on compliance with 
treatment plans and other clinical requirements.59  Housing First instead offers 
chronically homeless individuals permanent housing and then follows such 
placement with intensive services.  These services are typically provided 
through an Assertive Community Treatment (“ACT”) model of multiple 
service providers focusing together on individual clients.60  Central to the 
approach is a harm-reduction philosophy that makes available, but does not 
mandate, substance abuse, mental illness, or other treatment.61  
Complementing this harm-reduction approach, Housing First also emphasizes 
 
 55. See BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S HOMELESS, supra note 3, at 267-302, for a 
thorough overview of program structures and approaches in services for homeless individuals and 
families. 
 56. It is important to preface this discussion with a note of caution and clarification.  These 
examples largely focus on services for chronically homeless individuals as currently defined.  See 
supra text accompanying note 7.  This is not to deny the centrality of housing as such to 
preventing and responding to homelessness.  See Rosenthal & Foscarinis, supra note 4, at 326.  
Advocates have and can continue to play a role in the creative implementation of federal, state, 
and local housing programs.  This essay, however, focuses on services beyond shelter (temporary 
or permanent) itself. 
 57. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 127.  Housing First is part of a larger policy emphasis on 
permanent supportive housing as a response to homelessness particularly for individuals with 
disabilities or others who need on-going services.  See generally YIN-LING IRENE WONG ET AL., 
PREDICTING STAYING IN OR LEAVING PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING THAT SERVES 
HOMELESS PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS vii-ix (HUD ed., 2006), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/permhsgstudy.pdf (discussing the evolution of policy 
toward permanent supportive housing). 
 58. Housing First is also used to describe approaches to family homelessness, where it takes 
on a similar approach, albeit focused on the needs of families in crisis.  E-mail from Ryan Macy-
Hurley, Institute Coordinator, Institute for Research, Training, and Technical Assistance, Beyond 
Shelter, Inc., to Nestor Davidson, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School (Nov. 
17, 2006) (on file with author). 
 59. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 128. 
 60. See id. at 127-28. 
 61. See id. at 128; BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 27-28; see also WELLS ET 
AL., BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 50, at 73-74 (discussing low-demand services). 
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a consumer focus that gives primacy to a client’s own determination of 
needs.62 
A striking aspect of the rhetoric surrounding the Housing First movement 
is its emphasis on a “right” to housing in framing the permanency of the shelter 
offered to homeless persons.63  To legal advocates, the “permanent” nature of 
the housing provided in most Housing First programs would look less like an 
entitlement and more like a rhetorical commitment.  When Housing First 
providers talk about a right to housing, they are really advancing the concept 
that there is clinical and practical value in signaling to clients that the shelter 
being provided is not fragile, fleeting, or transitory.  At a cultural moment 
when conceptions of home have taken on increasingly strident political valence 
in response to perceptions that local governments are abusing the power of 
eminent domain,64 the value of this rhetoric cannot be discounted.  The “right” 
to housing asserted by some Housing First providers, however, is largely 
rooted in an evaluation of the clinical and practical advantages that long-term 
placements can provide.65  Advancing stability and facilitating the ACT model 
by ensuring that service teams have ready access to clients thus dovetail with 
the deep-seeded impulse for stability, inclusion, and individual dignity that a 
“right” to housing represents. 
The confluence of individual rights and clinical concerns also informs the 
harm-reduction aspect of Housing First.66  The increasing recognition that 
there are clinical benefits to less coercive approaches to substance abuse 
services translates norms of individual dignity into radically new program 
designs.  Mental-health and substance-abuse professionals have recognized 
that for clinical reasons, individuals who are unable to limit substance abuse as 
 
 62. See Ronni Michelle Greenwood et al., Decreasing Psychiatric Symptoms by Increasing 
Choice in Services for Adults with Histories of Homelessness, 36 AM. J. OF COMM. PSYCH. 223, 
225 (2005); Sam Tsemberis & Ronda Eisenberg, Pathways to Housing: Supported Housing for 
Street-Dwelling Homeless Individuals with Psychiatric Disabilities, 51 PSYCH. SERV. 487, 488-
89 (2000). 
 63. See, e.g., Tsemberis & Eisenberg, supra note 62, at 488 (discussing a leading Housing 
First program as having been “[f]ounded on the belief that housing is a basic human right for all 
individuals, regardless of disability”). 
 64. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), 
spawned a national outcry over so-called eminent domain abuse and legislation at the national 
and state level to restrict eminent domain for economic development.  At the center of this 
political reaction is veneration for the home, a theme in American law with deep roots and 
significant contemporary cultural resonance.  See generally D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a 
Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006). 
 65. See, e.g., Leyla Gulcur et al., Housing, Hospitalization, and Cost Outcomes for 
Homeless Individuals with Psychiatric Disabilities Participating in Continuum of Care and 
Housing First Programmes, 13 J. COMM. APPL. SOC. PSYCH. 171, 177-83 (2003) (discussing the 
comparative benefits of the Housing First model of service provision). 
 66. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 27. 
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a condition of receiving housing may nonetheless be able to manage and 
reduce substance use without the threat of program termination.67  This 
parallels the norms of individual dignity involved in Eighth Amendment and 
other advocacy. 
Likewise, emphasizing consumer choice has clear benefits in terms of 
individual outcomes and program effectiveness.  The consumer-choice aspect 
of Housing First evinces mental-health and housing-retention benefits in 
treating clients as empowered decision makers and not passive recipients of 
assistance.68  This not only parallels client-centered models of advocacy,69 but 
embodies norms of individual choice. 
B. Short-Circuiting the Institutional Cycle: Focusing on Discharge Planning 
Another important development in service provision for homeless 
individuals is an increasing focus on moments of transition in the institutional 
cycle that many homeless persons experience.70  If many homeless persons 
hobble together an intermittent chain of institutional placements in between 
stints on the streets,71 that chain is often abetted by the failure of the 
institutions that interface with homeless individuals to plan or sufficiently 
account for what happens to clients after discharge.  Sydney Watson has noted, 
for example, that treatment facilities, state psychiatric hospitals, detoxification 
programs and similar institutions often discharge clients literally to the streets 
or give to-be-released patients names and addresses of shelters.72  The lack of 
discharge planning likewise plays a critical role in homelessness for 
individuals transitioning out of incarceration.73 
Accordingly, discharge planning is coming to the fore as a critical tool to 
short-circuit the institutional cycle.74  To short-circuit the cycle of placements, 
discharge planning focuses on community-based efforts to connect those 
 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Greenwood et al., supra note 62, at 225, 235-236. 
 69. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1241-45. 
 70. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 31 (discussing the importance of 
“effective discharge planning from the many institutions that interface with chronically homeless 
people and those at risk of chronic homelessness: hospitals, treatment facilities, psychiatric 
institutions, correctional facilities, and sometimes foster care”). 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. 
 72. See Watson, supra note 11, at 362-63. 
 73. See Metraux & Culhane, supra note 11, at 514-15; Caterina Gouvis Roman & Jeremy 
Travis, Where Will I Sleep Tomorrow?  Housing, Homelessness and the Returning Prisoner, 17 
HOUS. POL’Y DEB. 389 (2006). 
 74. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 31; Watson, supra note 11, at 372-373.  
Some courts have held that discharge-planning statutes for health-care facilities preclude 
discharging clients to shelters.  See id. at 377-84. 
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experiencing homelessness or at risk of homelessness with appropriate 
resources.75  Effective discharge planning also focuses on individual choice.76 
This focus on the risks inherent in moments of transition for homeless 
persons and those at risk for homelessness reflects norms of individual care 
and the reality of the vulnerability of those who rely on institutional support.  
The most innovative discharge planning efforts have been client-driven and 
highly particularized, bridging service gaps and ensuring appropriate follow 
through.77  This kind of individualization and concern for vulnerability can 
vindicate advocates’ emphasis on resisting the transmutation of homeless 
persons into alien presences so evident in efforts to secure resources and resist 
criminalization. 
C. Reconceiving Outreach 
Outreach plays a critical role in making initial contact and maintaining 
contact with individuals living on the streets, providing a link to other facets of 
the system of services.78  Service providers are accordingly paying increasing 
attention to the design of outreach approaches.  The Choices Unlimited drop-in 
center, for example, provides a consumer-choice model of outreach.79  In this 
model, clients determine the sequence of services, and continuity is facilitated 
by retaining the same case manager as a client moves through program 
stages.80  The Choices Unlimited program has put this approach into operation 
through outreach, a drop-in center, respite housing, and coordination on 
follow-up services.81  The emphasis throughout is on consumer participation 
and direction, giving direct voice to recipients of services—a focus that makes 
it more likely that homeless individuals will avail themselves of the services 
and reduce their contact with institutional placements and the streets, among 
other positive outcomes.82  Similar innovative outreach efforts have included 
coordinated outreach centers that field teams from several agencies, provide 
 
 75. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 31. 
 76. See Watson, supra note 11, at 373-74. 
 77. See id. at 374-76. 
 78. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 20; WELLS ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR 
CHANGE, supra note 50, at 60-61. 
 79. See Sam J. Tsemberis et al., Consumer Preference Programs for Individuals Who Are 
Homeless and Have Psychiatric Disabilities: A Drop-In Center and a Supported Housing 
Program, 32 AM. J. OF COMM. PSYCH. 305, 307 (2003). 
 80. Id. at 307-308. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 308 (noting the results of a comparative study that showed that consumer-focused 
outreach lead to greater participation in services, less contact with the criminal justice system, 
improvements in life satisfaction for clients, and reduced time on the streets). 
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twenty-four hour service referrals, and collect data.83  A consistent element of 
successful outreach has been a connection to permanent housing options.84 
What unites these innovative approaches to outreach is the pragmatic 
recognition that the most effective approach to engaging those literally living 
on the streets with services requires planning, coordination, and responsiveness 
to individual circumstances.  This focus on consumer choice vindicates aspects 
of individual-rights advocacy that have highlighted the importance of allowing 
those without shelter to attend to the necessities of daily life without undue 
interference.85  A recent report for the federal Department of Health and 
Human Services on chronic homelessness for persons with mental illness and 
substance abuse disorders identifies values of choice, voice, empowerment, 
dignity and respect, and hope as essential to successful recovery from 
homelessness.86  These core values parallel in many respect the norms 
advocates have asserted on behalf of homeless individuals. 
D. Olmstead and Deinstitutionalization 
In Olmstead v. L.C.,87 the Supreme Court held that the public services 
provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act88 imposed a form of a less-
restrictive-setting obligation on states providing services to individuals with 
disabilities.89  Olmstead requires states to provide community-based treatment 
for persons with mental disabilities when such placement is appropriate, not 
opposed by the recipient, and can be reasonably accommodated, taking into 
account the resources available to the state and the needs of others with mental 
disabilities.90  Olmstead, with its sweeping language about the harms that 
segregation causes for individuals with disabilities, has become one of those 
decisions that transcends the context in which it arises to become a cultural 
symbol.91  The decision has had significant practical implications as well, as 
 
 83. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 20-23. 
 84. Id. at 23. 
 85. See WELLS ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 50, at 29-30. 
 86. Id. 
 87. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 88. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
 89. Olmstead involved a suit by two mentally retarded women, one of whom had been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and the other with a personality disorder. 527 U.S. at 593-594.  
The women were institutionalized in a Georgia psychiatric hospital despite clinical assessments 
that they could be treated appropriately in community-based settings.  Id.  Attorneys from Atlanta 
Legal Aid filed suit on their behalf, asserting that the failure to place these women in community 
programs violated Title II of the ADA.  Id.; see also Mary C. Cerreto, Olmstead: The Brown v. 
Board of Education for Disability Rights: Promises, Limits, and Issues, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 47, 
49-50 (2001). 
 90. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587. 
 91. See generally Cerreto, supra note 89; Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve P. Calandrillo, 
Forward to Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA Title II Integration Lawsuits After 
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advocates have rallied around Olmstead’s endorsement of integration as a 
practical tool for galvanizing providers of services for those with mental 
illness, for those experiencing or at risk of homelessness, and for individuals 
facing institutionalization more generally.92 
The application of Olmstead in the context of services for homeless 
individuals with mental disabilities again illustrates the potential of rights to 
guide approaches to advocacy.93  Olmstead’s vision of integration—that the 
ADA creates an affirmative obligation to move individuals with disabilities 
into community-integrated settings—takes norms of equal treatment and 
dignity and shapes a variety of day-to-day service decisions.94  Advocates have 
seized upon this vision of Olmstead to promote freedom of choice in services, 
emphasizing client involvement in service planning and decision-making.95  
Service providers are accordingly increasingly aware of Olmstead’s broad 
implications for integrating individuals with disabilities into mainstream 
programs and ensuring, to the extent possible, that such individuals can be 
supported to live where and how they wish.96 
 
Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 695 (2001); cf. Robert Tsai, Sacred Visions 
of Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1095, 1109-13 (2005) (discussing the iconic symbolism of 
constitutional decision making). 
 92. See Rachel Rubey, Note, There’s No Place Like Home: Housing for the Most Vulnerable 
Individuals with Severe Mental Disabilities, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1733-34 (2002); see also 
Patricia E. Kefalas Dudek, Using the Olmstead Decision as an Advocacy Tool for your Clients, 
15 WTR NAELA Q. 4 (2002) (describing the potential impact of Olmstead in advocacy for 
individuals in long-term care); cf. John T. Pardeck & Paul A. Rollinson, An Exploration of 
Violence Among Homeless Women with Emotional Disabilities: Implications for Practice and 
Policy, 4 J. SOC. WORK IN DISABILITY & REHAB. 63 (2002) (arguing that Olmstead may force 
states to provide services to homeless women with emotional disabilities to respond to the high 
incidence of violence among that group). 
 93. While Olmstead does not provide a clear entitlement to services, it has been cited as a 
source for an equality-based argument for such an affirmative right.  See Mark C. Weber, Home 
and Community-Based Services, Olmstead and Positive Rights: A Preliminary Discussion, 39 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 289-90 (2004).  While Olmstead recognized that the integration 
obligation it was outlining was limited by state resources, Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605, some courts 
have held that resource constraints alone will not shield public entities from similar ADA claims.  
See Dudek, supra note 92, at 6.  The “fundamental alteration” defense took on greater salience 
after Olmstead as a ground for resisting institutional change.  See generally Smith & Calandrillo, 
supra note 91. 
 94. See Cerreto, supra note 89, at 76 (“Perhaps the most fundamental impact of the 
Olmstead decision lies in its ability to foster the self-determination of people with disabilities.”). 
 95. Id. at 76-78; see also Emily Miller et al., The Olmstead Decision and Housing: 
Opportunity Knocks, OPENING DOORS, Vol. 12 (Dec. 2000) (discussing housing advocacy based 
on Olmstead on behalf of individuals with disabilities, including federal housing planning 
requirements). 
 96. Cf. Miller et al., supra note 95. 
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CONCLUSION 
Advocates have long taken vital roles in shaping public discourse about 
homelessness, securing resources, and, of course, defending the individual 
rights of those without shelter.  To these on-going and still necessary roles can 
be added an additional critical task: influencing the design and implementation 
of services for homeless persons.  Advocates come to this task with a set of 
tools honed over decades of long struggles.  These tools can translate the 
dignity, autonomy, liberty, and equality norms at the center of rights-based 
advocacy into a practical guide through which to shape how providers serve 
the homeless.  In all of the many settings in which those experiencing or at risk 
of homelessness find help, advocates can improve service provision, ultimately 
providing another avenue to vindicate the rights of those without shelter. 
 
